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TRANSCRIPT
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: So, I want to welcome everybody on behalf
of the Corporations, Securities & Antitrust Practice Group. My name is John
Nalbandian. I’m a judge on the Sixth Circuit, and I’m moderating our panel
today on The Future of Antitrust. I was a litigator in private practice, but I
always felt like I was working for the corporate lawyers, so I think nothing has
changed. But I want to thank The Federalist Society for inviting me back this
year to moderate a panel again and to moderate a panel on antitrust again, and I
take that as a compliment. I don’t know if it was meant that way, but I take it
that way.
In any event, last year, we talked about transparency and, specifically, whether
greater transparency was a possible incremental solution to, at least, perceived
issues that we have in antitrust. This year, suffice it to say, we’re pushing the
envelope, inviting our panelists, our distinguished panelists, if they so choose,
to question, what I would say, is maybe the bedrock principle of modern
antitrust, the corporate welfare standard first articulated by Robert Bork and
others 40 or 50 years ago.2 The idea behind the consumer welfare standard, of
course, is that the goal of antitrust law should be to maximize consumer welfare
and economic efficiency typically measured by lower prices and greater supply.3
As we all know, antitrust law is now a hot topic of discussion among not only
academics and hipsters, but politicians as well, as reflected in both public
statements and legislative proposals. As part of that discussion, the existing
enforcement regime, including the consumer welfare standard itself, have been
questioned by those who suggested focusing entirely on existing notions of
consumer welfare may be misplaced, that innovation, worker interest fostering
vibrant small business in the face of tech giants, and other societal values ought
to be served by our antitrust laws and their enforcers. Indeed, some have
suggested that our democracy itself is endangered by an ever-fewer number of
companies who dominate vital sectors of our economy.
I expect that our panelists will address these questions in addition to a range
of other topics, including, perhaps, merger enforcement priorities, including socalled killer acquisitions, market definitions, privacy and data regulations,
antitrust remedies, and others—other topics, I’m sorry, from both the U.S. and
E.U. perspective. In any event, let me get to our panel. The full and very
impressive bios, of course, are found in the app—conference app—so I won’t
repeat all of it here but let me briefly introduce them. First up is Makan
Delrahim, who serves as Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division,
although I suspect he’ll inform us that he’s probably speaking solely in his
individual capacity today.
2. Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 583, 583–86 (2018) (discussing the importance of Robert Bork’s work in shaping modern
antitrust law).
3. Id. at 589.
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HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: No.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: No? Official?
HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: Well, sure.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: His—
[Laughter.]
HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: We’re in the constitutional clear.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: So, whatever he says, you can estop the
government the next time you’re in court, right?
HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: We’ll argue against that.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: I’ll overrule that.
[Laughter.]
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: His antitrust experience, of course, is vast,
and vary serving as a partner in private practice, and as having various stints in
the government at DOJ and for the Senate Judiciary Committee. Next, we have
Gene Kimmelman. It’s not often that we get someone on a panel who The
Washington Post has referred to as both a “secret weapon and a consiglieri,”4
but he has been called both for the work that he did in the Antitrust Division
during the Obama administration. He currently serves, among other things, as
an adjunct law professor at GW, and is a senior advisor for the public interest
group, Public Knowledge, and he also got his J.D. at my beloved University of
Virginia, “Wa-hoo-wa.”
Next, we have Maureen Ohlhausen. Maureen is a partner at Baker Botts here
in D.C., where she serves as practice group chair for the Antitrust & Competition
Law Group. She was formerly the acting chair and commissioner of the Federal
Trade Commission. Suffice it to say, her antitrust experience is vast and
unparalleled. She has published numerous articles, testified numerous times in
Congress, and has received numerous awards, including the FTC’s Robert
Pitofsky Lifetime Achievement Award.
And finally, we have, for our European perspective, Dr. Rainer Wessely. He’s
a diplomat for the E.U. who is posted at the Delegation of the E.U. to the U.S.,
where he is Counselor for Competition and Justice Affairs. Before this, he
served in Brussels as Assistant to Directors-General with D.G. Competition, the
competition department within the E.C., and he has worked also in private
practice, and did various other positions at D.G. Competition. He holds a Ph.D.
in international trade law and an L.L.M. in European and international law. So,
join me in welcoming our panel. And with that, I give you Mr. Delrahim.
HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: Thank you so much, Your Honor. I very much
thank you for inviting me here to The Federalist Society, in particular, Dean
Reuter and other leaders of FedSoc [the Federalist Society], and congratulate
you on organizing, yet, another fantastic National Lawyers Convention, and to
4. Cecilia Kang, Obama’s ‘Secret Weapon’ on Antitrust Leaves Justice, WASHINGTON POST
(July 9, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/obamas-secret-weapon-onantitrust-leaves-justice-department/2012/07/09/gJQANAp7YW_story.html.
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my co-panelists, who are—I can say, have been longtime friends in various parts
of my antitrust life. And it’s an honor to be with them anywhere.
The subject of the panel, “The Future of Antitrust,” could not be more timely.
Antitrust law, in many ways, as boring as it might be to some, again, appears to
be at a crossroads. It has worked its way into the public consciousness and
debate unlike any time since probably the Microsoft case5 in the late 1990s. The
debate over antitrust law may be even louder today than it was then. And we
now have presidential hopefuls campaigning on how they will change or enforce
the antitrust laws. We’re also fortunate to have the first president in history
who’s actually been a plaintiff in antitrust law of an antitrust case.
At the Department of Justice, we have not shied away from this debate.
Indeed, it is imperative that the Executive Branch speak clearly on behalf of the
United States regarding the questions of antitrust policy, especially, when the
debate involves foreign antitrust enforcers analyzing the same conduct. Over
the past two years, where I’ve had the great privilege of serving as the Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust, I repeatedly hear the same question at
conferences and events across the United States and overseas; it’s the following:
is a consumer welfare standard capable of handling new threats to competition,
especially, in the context of digital markets?
I’ve given the same answer each time: Yes. I believe the consumer welfare
standard is flexible and adaptable enough for the 21st century and new business
models, such as digital platforms. It’s incumbent on enforcers and courts to stay
up to date with the latest economic thinking and understanding of new markets.
This is critical to ensuring that the consumer welfare standard keep space with
new technologies. This understanding of the consumer welfare standard,
flexible and adaptable, is exactly how Judge Bork and other titans of the Chicago
School Antitrust Revolution intended it.6
Judge Bork wrote the following in a new epilogue to the antitrust paradox 15
years after it was originally published:
Though the goal of antitrust statutes, as they now stand, should be
constant, the economic rules that implement that goal should not. It
has been understood from the beginning that the rules will and should
alter as economic understanding progresses. Consistent with this
understanding for over 40 years, the consumer welfare standard has
served as a neutral principle for the administration of the antitrust
laws. It focuses enforcers and courts on harm to competition and
requires them to evaluate competitive effects.7

5. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (2001).
6. Adam J. DiVencenzo, Editor’s Note: Robert Bork, Originalism, and Bounded Antitrust,
79 ANTITRUST L.J. 821, 823, 829 (2014).
7. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 430 (2d
ed. 1993).
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The consumer welfare standard is agnostic to considerations other than the
actual competitive process drawing the line in this matter is crucial. Otherwise,
enforcers or courts would be placed in the powerful and awkward position of
deciding whether a pro-consumer practice nevertheless violates antitrust laws
because it offends a non-competition value, such as free speech.
Justice Robert Jackson, another antitrust visionary, understood this concern
well and emphasized the need for neutral principles of antitrust enforcement, 40
years before Judge Bork did, in a 1937 speech entitled “Should the Antitrust
Laws be Revised?8 Then-Assistant Attorney General Jackson argued, “What is
needed is the establishment of a consistent national policy of monopoly control,
intelligible to those expected to comply with it, and those expected to enforce
it.”9 Jackson warned that the only probable alternative to a consistent national
policy, favoring competition, is government control of industry.10
What does the future hold for consumer welfare standard? That’s up to us.
No policy, no matter how sound, is immune to calls for change. Throughout
history, when reformers fail in the legislative arena, they will turn to existing
laws and regulations and try to manipulate them in ways never previously seen.
I won’t mention specific examples, but we have seen this playbook when federal
courts interpret or, more accurately, rewrite the law in head scratching ways and
when agencies issue new regulations that strain the statutory text. Some
reformers now seek to bring this playbook to the domain of antitrust law, which,
if read broadly, could wield tremendous power over the economy. Unbridled,
this power could do significant damage to the economic impulses that drive
innovation, gains, and efficiency, and other pro-competitive outcomes for
consumers.
Antitrust law may be particularly vulnerable to hasty change given its
common law status and evolution in light of advancements and economic
thinking. We will see in our lifetimes whether the pendulum will swing back
and unravel the progress the field has made. What can practitioners, academics,
judges, and enforcers do if they want to preserve the consumer welfare standard?
First and foremost, we should not be complacent. Many deride the latest reform
movement as “hipster” antitrust because advocates for abandoning the consumer
welfare standard invoked a decades-old trust-busting era that we now consider
antiquated and economically misguided. Labeling one’s opponents only go so
far.
Winning the economic debate goes further, but not far enough. The modern
antitrust reform movement is less concerned about economic soundness than it
is about results. That means we must demonstrate to observers that we will
pursue effective results whenever we find anticompetitive conduct. We must be

8. See, Robert H. Jackson, Should the Antitrust Laws Be Revised?, 71 U.S. L. REV. 575
(1937).
9. Id. at 576.
10. Id.
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vigilant to ensure that the biggest companies are minding the guardrails of
competition. If we don’t act swiftly and certainly, then we risk looking impotent
next to those who would punish monopolists just for being big. That approach,
of course, is an axe where a scalpel is needed. If we don’t use our scalpel, we
shouldn’t be surprised to see the reformers sharpening their axes.
Second, and more importantly, I believe that the consumer welfare standard
will survive in the winds of change if we prove that it actually works. Antitrust
law must live up to its promise of protecting competition and consumers. That
requires enforcers to think creatively and act vigorously. In particular, enforcers
must answer critics of the consumer welfare standard who wrongly assert that it
is concerned only with price effects. That has never been the case. For decades,
the courts have interpreted the Sherman Act11 and the Clayton Act12 as
recognizing harms to competition in the form of lower output, decreased
innovation, and reduction in quality and consumer choice.
Indeed, the harms asserted by the government in the Microsoft case13 took the
form of reduced innovation and consumer choice. The D.C. Circuit recently
affirmed this innovation-centric approach in the AT&T-Time Warner opinion.14
Despite the district court’s factual findings in that case, the circuit court’s
opinion was favorable to future antitrust enforcement actions in several
respects.15 Among others, the court recognized that harm to competition extends
“beyond higher prices for consumers, including decreased product quality and
reduced innovation.”16 The court’s legal analysis will help us when we bring
our next case alleging non-price effects as a competitive harm.
To be sure, price effects are easiest to quantify and may be an effective way
to appeal to a skeptical judge or jury. They are not, however, the exhaustive
means of proving an antitrust violation. Instead, we should focus our energy on
an understanding the broader set of effects that may result from anticompetitive
behavior or transactions. Ultimately, I believe the antitrust law and consumer
welfare standard will survive the winds of proposed reform in much the same
way that Judge Bork envisioned it. It’s up to us, however, to keep the foundation
steady through a vigorous action to protect competition and the American
consumer. I thank you and I look forward to the discussions.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Great. Thank you.
HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: Thank you.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Gene Kimmelman.
PROF. GENE KIMMELMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. And thank you and
for inviting me. It’s a pleasure being here, and I always enjoy the opportunity
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38 (1890).
The Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (1914).
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (2001).
United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1045.
Id.
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to see if I can agree with my Assistant Attorney General as much as possible,
and in this case it’s actually quite easy to do so. We fundamentally do agree. I
think I can identify almost everything I was going to say in what the Assistant
Attorney General just described about the benefits of using neutral principles
and applying a standard rigorously, impartially, and thoroughly, and I’ll come
back to that. The one thing I’ll disagree with is, I would not be so negative in
description of the reformers. I believe they raise a lot of important issues about
things that are problems in our society. But I think we’d probably agree they
don’t belong in the antitrust analytics. They probably belong in other policy
discussions. So, I want to come back to that.
What I think is most important in thinking about the consumer welfare
standard is whether it really does stand up to what we’re experiencing in the
digital marketplace. And I hope that it can, and I think the Assistant Attorney
General has identified the elements of it that can be effectively applied, looking
at quality, looking at innovation, looking carefully at data as a part of the
calculus. But I have some skepticism, and that’s why I want to come back to
some of the other policies, and here’s why: I think what we’re experiencing,
when we look at the Facebooks, the Googles, the Amazons, and the Apples of
the world, is that in the digital marketplace, the network effects are enormous.
People want to be on the same social network. There are a lot of benefits to
it on both sides of that. People want to use the same apps and services, like
Search. We see natural direct and indirect network effects here. We see
companies that have made enormous investments with enormous upfront capital
cost, then reaping the benefits of declining marginal cost over time. Economies
of scale develop naturally with the structure of the way the digital marketplace
is unfolding. But what I think is different than the railroads, the telephone
companies, cable, and others is we’re now experiencing a power in data through
monetization of data to a magnitude and velocity that we’ve never experienced
before in our society.
Data has always been valuable, but now there’s so much more that can be
done with it, and there’s so much more of it available at low cost. It has also
provided a lot of economies of scope to these companies. So, what I see is
companies that have gotten ahead through whatever means. Hopefully, if any
of it is illegal, my colleagues here, who are enforcers, will actually prevent that
from continuing and put an end to it. But a lot of it can be through the natural
economics of the marketplace.
And what that has led to is, I think, a legitimate concern about the difficulty
of entry: you need massive scale to enter. You need a lot of capital, and you
need to be able to expand rather quickly against companies with declining costs.
Very difficult to do. I think we’re not seeing the venture capital coming in to
support that. Those are, I think, legitimate concerns in the market. And they
may be tipping towards a few or even one player in certain segments.
So, these are important concerns that I think need to be addressed, and
antitrust can address them through the consumer welfare standard, when it is
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applied effectively and thoroughly. The abuses, the “putting your thumb on the
scale” to take advantage of the competitive advantages some of the dominant
firms may have to abuse the competitive process can be somewhat dealt with
under that standard. But, if we want a society in a digital marketplace with as
much innovation as possible and to push the envelope on as much competition
as possible, I’m not sure antitrust can do enough. But, the world doesn’t stop
there. We’ve faced this before. In almost every other industrial sector, we have,
for a variety of reasons, almost always also developed other policy tools that are
sector-specific to an industry, whether it’s agriculture, or healthcare, or
securities, telecommunications.
And I think that’s what we need to consider here. I do not ask the Assistant
Attorney General to do it. I do not ask the Federal Trade Commission to do it.
They’re bound by their current statutes. But, I do think this is the job of
Congress, and I think it’s also the job of Congress when you have issues like
democracy, issues of disinformation, issues of abuse of power. These can be
indirectly affected through antitrust, but, when you have those important issues
on the table, it’s the job of Congress to have an open debate about how to make
sure that we protect the pillars of our democratic society.
So, here’s my, I think, best example of how we’ve done this before. Many of
you recall, the last time we broke up a company was the Ma Bell, the AT&T
monopoly, in 1984. There was a long series of both regulatory failures,
regulatory capture at certain points, and inability of regulation to work, that led
to the Justice Department intervening in the Reagan administration. But I
believe that what really made that work in a sustainable way, from that time until
today, was the fact that we could interconnect all the telephone companies that
were separated in a seamless, low-friction manner. That was done through—not
the breakup, not through Judge Harold Greene; it was done through the Federal
Communications Commission. The fact that when you pick up your phone, and
you decide you don’t like the current carrier you have, and you want to go
somewhere else, you don’t have to give up your phone number—number
portability. The ability to do that was the Federal Communications Commission.
There are a number of things that we have relied on, other policy tools that I
would call pro-competition policies that augment antitrust, that are not in
conflict with, but they’re also, usually, not the kinds of remedies that are easily
administrable through antitrust enforcement. So, in these digital markets, I think
we need to look to whether—or this is what I would like Congress to consider:
whether we need the kind of things like portability of numbers. Here, it might
be data portability with data protections. The ability to connect networks:
interoperability. Should you be able to go from Snap to Facebook without
having to go into their ecosystem but have some open protocols that enable you
to communicate with Facebook friends without being on Facebook? Would that
be useful? Would that be beneficial? I think these are important policy
discussions.
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Discrimination. The Assistant Attorney General mentioned the AT&T-Time
Warner17 case—a valiant effort. But the Federal Communications Commission
has also used nondiscrimination to prevent cable companies from blocking
satellite companies from entering the market and expanding in the market. You
call that, to me, pro-competitive standards that augment what antitrust does.
These are the kinds of things I would like to see Congress discuss so that the role
of our antitrust enforcers, in using the consumer welfare standard well and
effectively, can actually generate more competition in the digital marketplace.
Thank you.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Thank you. Maureen Ohlhausen.
HON. MAUREEN OHLHAUSEN: Well, thank you. Thanks to The
Federalist Society for having me. I’m a last-minute addition to the panel, and so
I’m actually going to take the liberty of not looking forward. I know this is about
the future of antitrust, but I think an important thing before we look forward to
saying where it should go. And my co-panelists have already raised some very
important points I look forward to discussing, but I also wanted to tie this to the
foundations of antitrust, and to our market system, and to our government
system.
As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, the heart of our national economic
policy has long been the faith and the value of competition. And I think right
now there are some questioning about whether this should be the central value,
whether—what competition is, and what’s the government’s role in fostering, or
protecting, or replacing competition. The Supreme Court further described the
antitrust laws as being important to the preservation of economic freedom and
our free enterprise system as important to that as the Bill of Rights is to the
protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.
Protecting and promoting competition is an important job, and it’s one that’s
related to another foundational principle of our government, which is the
protection of individual liberty. And today, I just want to take a few minutes to
examine this link between competition and liberty, and, specifically, through the
lens of The Federalist Society principles, which are that the state exists to
preserve freedom, that the separation of government powers is central to our
constitution, and that it’s emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to
say what the law is and not what it should be.
A fundamental question is, what is competition and why does that matter? At
first blush, competition may seem like a relatively straightforward concept
because we all know a competitive market when we see it. And Adam Smith
described it as a market where goods and services are sold at their natural
prices.18 Now, two of America’s leading industrial economists, Dennis Carlton
and Jeffrey Perloff, have described the indicia of a market operating under
17. Id.
18. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS, 73–74 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., LibraryClassics 1981) (1776).
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perfect competition as having homogenous output, perfect information among
buyers and sellers, no transaction cost, price taking by buyers and sellers, and
no externalities.19
But these indicia don’t explain what competition is any more than saying it’s
a sunny day explains what weather is. Instead these observations give a snapshot
of an ideal outcome rather than the process that tends toward that particular
outcome. Too often the output of the competitive process—whether that’s low
prices, or wider choice, or greater innovation—gets confused with the process
itself. Competition is the activity of individuals pursuing their economic selfinterest by convincing others to buy the good or service that they sell.
Now, of course, buyers are also pursuing their self-interest. And the exchange
between a buyer and seller leaves both better off, even though each one is
pursuing his or her own interest. As Adam Smith explained, it’s not from the
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner
but from their regard to their own interest.20 And—I’m a big Adam Smith fan—
as Smith further explained, it’s the vigorous pursuit of a person’s individual
interest that naturally, or rather, necessarily leads him to prefer that employment,
which is most advantageous to society.21
As a modern commentator has observed, the entrepreneur has a central role as
the agent of change who prods and pulls the market in new directions. Thanks
to the liberty-preserving protections of limited government and individual rights,
we are free to pursue our self-interests or to pursue happiness, as the founding
fathers who eloquently stated. Individuals exercising liberty in the pursuit of
self-fulfillment and prosperity, collectively, give rise to competition, and, while
entrepreneurs pursue their own welfare-maximizing endeavors, the invisible
hand of the competitive market steers the producers in directions that maximize
social welfare or consumer welfare.
Market competition should determine the winners and losers. And
competition, like liberty, isn’t for the meek, and it requires grit, and
determination, and stamina, and its creative destruction is the dynamic cycle
that, while uncertain for the competitor, motivates the entrepreneur and gives
rise to new inventions that benefit society.
What is the role of government in protecting competition? Now, I don’t think
that government creates or drives competition. I think government instead
provides a framework in which competition can thrive. As Milton Friedman
described, the purpose of government in a free economy is to do what markets
cannot do.22 That is to serve as an umpire and do things like create money and

19. Malcom B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Daubert, Science, and Modern Game Theory:
Implications for Merger Analysis, 20 S. CT. ECON. REV. 125, 153 n.117 (2012).
20. Smith, supra note 17, 26–27.
21. Id. at 348.
22. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 31 (1982).
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build infrastructure. The role of government is not to dictate the outcomes of
the market process.
I agree with this description of the role of government as the umpire, and it
should make sure that competitors fairly compete on the merits, and, at least, for
competition law, it should not dictate outcomes, but it should be sure that the
sides are not agreeing to shave points, or prevent better players from playing, or
colluding, or combining teams to undermine the nature of the contest. I also
think we need to keep in mind the difference between competition and
regulation, and some of the things Gene already mentioned, I think, may be
regulatory goals worth pursuing, but I wouldn’t put forward our competition
laws as the way to pursue those. I look forward to our discussion and thank you
for having me.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Great. Thank you. Dr. Wessely.
DR. RAINER WESSELY: Thank you. Thank you so much to The Federalist
Society for inviting me to this panel for this exciting topic and to this very
beautiful venue. If you talk about the future of a policy, it’s always good to
know who your policymakers are, and that can be a bit tricky sometimes. I will
have to start with the usual disclaimer that I cannot speak on behalf of the
Commission. I can only speak in my personal capacity. Today is the 14th of
November 2019 and back in Brussels an exciting and important day. I will come
to that in a moment.
So, we had European elections earlier in May this year, and I would’ve
expected and thought that by today, and when I accepted the invitation to speak
today, I would have more clarity on who the new commissioners would be. We
have a new Commission President-elect—Ursula von der Leyen—but,
unfortunately, we don’t have a E.U. Commission in place yet. It was actually to
take duty 1st of November two weeks ago.
However, as many of you will be aware, we are just now still in between two
E.U. Commissions: the outgoing Junker Commission and the incoming von der
Leyen Commission. Most of the newly designated commissioners have already
successfully gone through their hearings in front of the European Parliament.
Some of them have been rejected, and some of our Member States had to
nominate new commissioners. This is why today is a very exciting day because
we are having the last hearings in front of the Parliament for the three
outstanding commissioners.
Some of the reports that I’ve seen are extremely critical about this process.
They see that this is a dangerous setback for European policymaking. On the
other hand, I think it shows that the democratic system is working, and the
checks and balances that are in place to protect European citizens are actually
working. And to complicate things, we received, yesterday evening, a letter
from the U.K., and were informed that the U.K. does not have the intention to
nominate a commissioner for the new upcoming commission. So, we have to
deal with this also. So, touching wood, I hope that with the hearings going on
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today, we will have an E.U. Commission rather soon in place, and, potentially,
as early as of 1st December this year.
With a new Commission, there comes new energy, there comes new steer, and
there’s always a certain degree of change. And I think we are looking forward
to seeing what this change will be in terms of antitrust and antitrust enforcement.
However, we already know, something that is almost certain, that the new
commissioner for competition will be a very familiar one. We will have
Margrethe Vestager serving in a second term, and she will occupy not only the
role as Commissioner for Competition, but she will even be in an extended and
expanded role as Executive Vice-President for the digital age to make Europe fit
for the digital future.23
I will not go into detail of what this role actually entails, just to mention a bit
of what she has promised and said in her hearings. She has committed herself
to present a new European strategy for artificial intelligence within the first 100
days of being in office.24 She will coordinate the work on a new digital services
act, which will, amongst other [things], deal with the liability of platforms, that
will be heavily inspired by her work as Competition Commissioner.25 She will
look into the best ways to facilitate access and exchange of data and big data for
innovation.26 She will look into an industrial strategy and a strategy for SMEs
in the digital age, and she will work on international solutions for digital
taxation.27
While listening to all of this, you might wonder what the other commissioners
will be doing. So looking at where we are today, and certainly from a European
perspective, it is an excellent moment to take stock of what we have done over
the last four, five years in the outgoing mandate, and I think we would all agree
that it has been a very exciting period in terms of antitrust enforcement.
One thing that I would certainly anticipate, at this point in time, is that we will
see with the new commissioner being the old commissioner a certain degree of
stability and continuity in our enforcement efforts. I hope that we will be able
to build on a number of lessons that we have learned during the last five years,
and I think three of them are particularly relevant for today’s debate.
The first one is that we have conducted, in the last mandate, a sector inquiry
into e-commerce. We did that between 2015 and 2017, and we have learned a

23. THE COMMISSIONERS: MARGRETHE VESTAGER, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
commissioners/2019-2024/vestager_en (last visited March 25, 2020).
24. Von der Leyen’s Real 100-Day Challenge, POLITICO (Dec. 1, 2019, 9:25 AM),
https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-european-commission-first-100-daystimeline/.
25. Hearing of Margrethe Vestager Executive Vice-President-Designate of the European
Commission (Europe Fit for the Digital Age) 5–7 (Oct. 8, 2019) (remarks of Margrethe Vestager,
Commissioner-designate),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/resources/library/media/
20191009RES63801/20191009RES6 3801.pdf.
26. Id. at 22 (remarks of Margrethe Vestager, Commissioner-designate).
27. Id. at 6-16 (remarks of Margrethe Vestager, Commissioner-designate).
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lot about vertical relationships. The sector inquiry was actually meant to tackle
various barriers to ecommerce within Europe, but it allowed us to understand
these markets much better. Actually, using sector inquiries is a very powerful
tool, and I wonder whether we will not see an announcement of a new sector
inquiry rather soon and early within the new commission mandate.
The second source of knowledge we will certainly derive from is all the
antitrust enforcement that we have done over the last years in the digital sphere,
and I think most particular the cases that we did against Amazon in the e-Books28
case, which was a settlement where we addressed Amazon’s most-favored
nation clauses. Our cases against Google, all three of them, Google Search,29
Android,30 and AdSense,31 and our case against Qualcomm32 in the exclusivity
case.
And I am looking forward to not only learning from the experience that we
get from the investigations that we did during this time but also, and, in
particular, from all the remedies discussions that we had with these companies
in the last month and years, and, certainly, also from the judgments. As many
of you will know, all of these, or most of these cases are still pending in front of
European courts.
And the third source of information will come from the report that we have
received—or better, that Commissioner Vestager has received—from her
special advisors. She had asked three advisors to look into enforcement in the
digital age, and the report lays out the context of competition enforcement into
platforms and the relevance of data and innovation.
In addition to that, I’m looking very much forward to also learn from the
experience that we will see on this side of the Atlantic with a lot going on, let it
be, at the DOJ, at the FTC, the investigations led by the state attorneys general,
or even by Congress.
To sum up, all these actions and activities have allowed us to confirm, in
principle, that the tools that we have are sharp enough to tackle the issues and
phenomena that we see in a digital world, let it be data, let it be platforms.
However, I think we also have to recognize that some of the new challenges
need quick and very decisive responses. We need remedies that adapt to the
28. European Commission Press Release IP/17/1223, Antitrust: Commission Accepts
Commitments from Amazon on e-books (May 4, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_1223.
29. European Union Press Release, IP/17/1784, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42
Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison
Shopping Service (June 27, 2017).
30. European Union Press Release, IP/18/4581, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €4.34
Billion for Illegal Practices Regarding Android Mobile Devices to Strengthen Dominance of
Google’s Search Engine (July 18, 2018).
31. European Union Press Release, IP/19/1770, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €1.49
Billion for Abusive Practices in Online Advertising (Mar. 20, 2019).
32. European Union Press Release, Antitrust: Commission fines Qualcomm €997 million for
abuse of dominant market position (Jan. 1, 2018).
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special characteristics of these markets, such as networks effects and data
accumulation.
I think we see that these markets are not necessarily self-correcting. Our
experience confirms that market concentration and dominance are not
competition concerns, as such, as long as markets remain contestable so that we
see competition for the market and dominant players play by the rules under
pressure to compete and innovate for the ultimate benefit of consumers, so that
we see competition within the markets.
And finally—and that I think mirrors very much what has been said before—
we have seen, over time, and learned that not all of these phenomena are actually
competition issues. Most of us, I hope, will agree that competition policy and
law cannot possibly address all the problems arising from digitalization, where
certain topics concern very precise and separate public policy objectives. We
should use other means, such as regulation, and have well-designed regulation
to tackle these concerns. Thank you very much.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Do any of you all have any comments on
what you’ve heard? I guess, I’ll start there.
HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: I’m just sad to see that our confirmation
process is going across the Atlantic Ocean to the European Union. It didn’t used
to work that way in the E.U.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Let me—
DR. RAINER WESSELY: It’s not the first time.
HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: It’s not. Yeah.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Let me ask a question. Dr. Wessely talked
a little bit about sector inquiry, and it’s something that, I guess, I’ve associated
with Europe more than the U.S. Is that something that would be more formal
that we could use more formally in the U.S.? Is that something that the
Department has looked at?
HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: Well, this is something I’ll speak in personal
capacity since—no, as far as our position has been, the antitrust laws are
perfectly capable of dealing with the competition issues. As far as sectoral
regulation, it’s been my belief that it should be, I think, the solution of last resort.
I don’t know—I agree with Gene on many things, but I don’t know if healthcare
and its regulation in this country, or frankly even telecom, have been models of
competition or ultimately consumer benefit.
I think there’s a lot of inefficiencies in a system where you have a regulatory
system that could be captured. So, I hope we don’t go there. That’s not to say
that we may not. Ultimately, if we fail to address some of the competition issues
that we would identify, that could be an issue that we might have to resort to,
but hopefully, it’s an issue of last resort.
HON. MAUREEN OHLHAUSEN: I just wanted to mention that the Federal
Trade Commission does have powers under its statute to do studies using
compulsory process, and it’s done it in areas such as Patent Assertion Entities
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looking at the efficacy of merger remedies and things like that. And it’s typically
led to a report on these issues, sometimes with recommendations.
PROF. GENE KIMMELMAN: I hope the Assistant Attorney General is right
that we don’t need to get to the last resort, but I worry that even with the strongest
antitrust enforcement, we have forces at play in the digital marketplace that
really deserve congressional attention as to whether you’re getting enough
competition, you’re getting enough innovation, you’re getting enough entry in
the markets. And I think it’s a fair debate whether that last resort has more cost
than benefits or benefits than cost. It could be done well, and it could be done
poorly. But I think we need to have that debate as the enforcers are doing their
jobs thoroughly and quickly to do what the antitrust laws can do.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Do you want to—
DR. RAINER WESSELY: Just to add one word on the sector inquiries: as
such, I think they have been an extremely helpful tool in Europe, not only to
learn about the sectors and to learn where we have to enforce, but they have also
helped us to inform the regulatory debate. For example, when you look at our
last e-commerce sector inquiry, the lessons that we took away, for example, that
we found a lot of geo-blocking, that companies actually blocked access for
customers from other Member States, which has led us to the adoption of geoblocking regulation to prohibit certain of these practices. So, I think the benefit
of the kind of inquiries is twofold: it’s valuable for enforcement, but also to make
a much better and informed decision on regulation through competition
informed regulation.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Great. Let me ask another question—and I
know a couple of you mentioned the big data issue, or the data collection issue
and what’s going on now with these big tech companies. I’d like to just maybe
do a little deeper dive on that. Is there any role for antitrust law here with
concerns with privacy and data collection, or is it completely something that’s
going to be outside of that realm?
HON. MAUREEN OHLHAUSEN: I’m sure Makan also has some views on
this. Data is an important asset, and there’s been lots of antitrust cases brought
regarding combinations of specific data sets, particularly in mergers, right? You
think about—and sometimes about consumer data, real estate records, credit
data, things like that. It’s not a strange idea to think that a data set, even about
consumer data, might not be an important asset that could have implications for
competition.
I think the question there is to apply those traditional, competitive, analytical
tools to a competition analysis for data. Because I feel some of it’s getting
jumped over, which is the idea that one company has a lot of data, and it’s useful,
and that’s a problem in itself. Or it’s buying another company that might have
a different type of data. Normally, we would think that combining two
complimentary assets might well be considered an efficiency in a merger
analysis. Is the fact that there might be privacy implications for that, how would
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you take that into account in an antitrust analysis, I think, is one of the important
questions.
If the companies are competing on privacy, and there’s going to be a reduction
in privacy, then, I think, that is something that is part of a traditional antitrust
analysis. One of the other things that I’m finding is, are people asking the hard
question of “Is that data, that the company has, so unique or so uniquely
valuable, or is there really an entry barrier, or can you buy that data from other
sources, like data brokers, or can you collect it more easily?” I think some of
those questions are not getting the careful attention that they deserve.
One other thing that I do want to mention is privacy is a very important value,
and it’s just because it may not be something you would take into account
separate from an antitrust analysis, doesn’t mean that it’s not important. I think
you need to look at the tools for protecting privacy directly. When you look at,
for example, the Bundeskartellamt brought a case against Facebook,33 and said
that Facebook’s use of data, which the Bundeskartellamt presumably found
violated the privacy laws, not that the Bundeskartellamt enforces them.34 It said
it was an antitrust competition violation and was imposing a remedy.
And on appeal, the intermediate court struck that down, and said you need to
analyze whether there’s a competition impact here.35 I think that case—the
Bundeskartellamt said it’s going to appeal it. But I think that brought to the fore
those very important modes of analysis that need to be brought to bear here.
What law are you using? Is it the competition law? Is it the antitrust law, and
when does antitrust law apply to data?
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Big data.
HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: So, I think Maureen covered—and I think
there’s not a whole lot of sunlight between us. The one thing I would say is that
as we discuss data, we need to think about different types. Data is so multifaceted; we actually do a disservice to the public [inaudible 01:02:07] by just
calling it data or big data. We had a big, I think, a constructive debate yesterday
in the House Judiciary Committee on this issue, and are you looking at user data,
are you looking at usage data, are you looking at what kind of data? Who’s
collecting it? How are they using it?
And certainly privacy, as I’ve said before, is a qualitative element of
competition, and that’s something companies can compete on. So actual
competition between the two, assuming consumers want that, is a qualitative
element appropriate for antitrust enforcement considerations. But we have to
think about, what is happening with this data? What are they doing with it?
33. Case B6-22/16, Bundeskartellamt v. Facebook, 6 February 2019 (Germany).
34. Germany: Bundeskartellamt Publishes English Version of the Facebook Decision, CPI
(July 11, 2019), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/germany-decision-of-facebookproceeding-published/.
35. Giuseppe Colangelo, Facebook and the Bundeskartellamt’s Winter of Discontent, CPI
(Sept.
23,
2019),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/facebook-andbundeskartellamts-winter-of-discontent/.
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How are they collecting it? And there’s other laws and, I think, public policies
that are implicated, which all lead to—because of the network effects that Gene
was talking about—some competitive concerns, but I think this is a healthy
debate.
We have multiple privacy regimes in this country for healthcare information,
for your financial records, for driver’s licenses, for whatever, but we don’t have
a generalized one. And many of you may or may not know that if you have a
cell phone, when you’re sleeping, it is collecting data. It’s sending about 10
pings every minute to certain companies that are collecting all of that
information. It knows when you’re asleep. It knows when you’re in a car. It
knows what floor you’re on in a building. You have no idea that your phone is
sending that information, and it’s collecting all of that information about you.
And all of that is being used to sell ads at a higher value to you. It raises really
important policy issues for people who care about civil liberties; people who
care about the actual bargain that goes on between a consumer and a company
with a lot of power.
PROF. GENE KIMMELMAN: If I could just add, I mostly agree with what
Maureen and the Assistant Attorney General have said. To put a finer point on
Makan’s last comment, I think we need to look at how power might be leveraged
using that data. It’s not just the quantity. I think Maureen’s totally right. But,
if we’re looking at the monetization that is going on now in advertiser-supported
services—the ability to get all of the information off of the phones, the ability to
get it more quickly, the ability to get more precise combinations of things that
define what our traits are for a particular purpose, not just necessarily eavesdrop
on us—that could be creepy—but to be able to predict what you may want to
buy, or want to use, or where you might want to go on vacation, or something
else that’s extremely valuable to advertisers, that’s where the competitive issue,
I think, is going to be most important to look at and understand how the
consumer welfare standard can be refined to draw that into the analytics.
HON. MAUREEN OHLHAUSEN: Actually, I wanted to mention one other
thing on the privacy and antitrust interface. Some of the things that Gene has
mentioned and that Makan has mentioned, there is this understanding that data
can be a very important aspect for competition. So, there are some voices saying
“Oh, because it’s such an important aspect of competition, what we’re going to
do is try to force companies to share the consumer data with other companies.”
And I think it’s important to keep in mind, as we’re also seeing these
regulatory solutions or regimes being put forward to give consumers greater
control over their data, and to restrict sharing of data, and to say, “Once you
collect it, you can only use it for that purpose, and you can’t share it; you can’t
use it in these other ways, or you’ve got to keep your lid on it,” it’s creating this
tension or there are these cross currents between privacy and antitrust.
And some of the solutions that are being floated in the antitrust world, and
some in Europe, in particular, actually, I think, run very much counter to the
consumer sovereignty views that are driving a lot of data privacy protections and
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things like GDPR. There are some other things: GDPR has a data portability
requirement, which could help reduce lock-in and could help foster some
competition. It’s not all one direction, but there are some important challenges,
I think, to be addressed as these two areas come into collision.
DR. RAINER WESSELY: Perhaps quickly to add to that – thank you for
highlighting the debate also in Europe. I certainly agree when it comes to
mergers, and I think we have seen a lot of mergers where we have made data
assessments. We treated data as currency, as assets, as barriers to entry, and as
parameters of competition, and I think we found ways to deal elegantly with data
questions.
I think what is newer is that we also analyze data in the context of antitrust.
We have an ongoing investigation into Amazon, where one of the questions is
how to assess Amazon as a platform with a dual function. So, Amazon is not
only offering this platform to merchants to sell via the platform but it’s also
selling its product itself via the platform, and it’s inherent in this double function
that you have access to very sensitive data from your competitors, from your
competitors downstream.
So, we’re looking into the question of whether this access and the use of
competitive sensitive information could be seen as potential antitrust violation.
We have opened the investigation, it’s still too early to make any statements
here, but it is something that will keep us busy. We are looking in this type of
dual role also in other cases. We are looking into that in Apple, looking into the
Apple App store selling apps from competitors in competition to its’ own Apple
apps. We’re also looking into that in our Facebook investigation, where we
started asking questions about Facebook’s marketplace.
So, all these cases are very much data-focused. I fully agree that it is too early,
for the moment, to say that we need more intrusive data remedies, but I think we
should at least have the debate, and when I look at the report from the special
advisors, they have identified the access to accumulated data as one of the
biggest problems in terms of market concentration. And I think we should have
the debate, and we need the debate about in which abuse cases or in which
merger cases we would actually have to have forced data access or shared access,
and I would be surprised that this debate would not also come over the Atlantic
and be debated here.
One final point on privacy: I was very surprised to learn yesterday, listening
to the Congress hearing, that data privacy is seen as one of the drivers for more
concentration. This is certainly something that we do not experience, and I
think, and I fully agree, that we should keep the privacy debate and the antitrust
debate separate.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Great. I do want to—we have some time
for questions. So, if anybody’s got questions, we’ve got a microphone over here
and one over there. So, if anybody wants to make their way to the microphones,
otherwise, I’m going to ask a question, another one. I’m curious about—and I
had mentioned in my introductory remarks the idea of killer acquisitions, which
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I view as kind of a redux of the old debate about whether monopolists stifle
innovation or not. And, obviously, the idea is bigger companies are acquiring
smaller companies that are maybe innovative, or have a certain segment of the
market, and then just swallowing them up. Is that a unique problem? Is that
something that we need to be concerned about? Do we have remedies for it?
Should we care? Anyone?
HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: Well, certainly, I think if you have a company
with market power, that the documents show or is intending to take a look at a
competitor that would challenge that power, that market power, and are
acquiring that just to crush them. It’s something that — like the character in The
Irishman, if some of you have seen it, they are talking about Mr. Johnny
Whispers, and said “It would be something we would be a little bit concerned
about.”36
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: What about a company though that is, say,
a Google or something that has, let’s say, market power in searches, but they
acquire a YouTube or something. Maybe not in that a competitor but in just
another tech company that’s doing something interesting and innovative.
HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: So, I think the burden would be on us to define
the market that we’re talking about, and is that going to be a new competitor that
is going to challenge that? And without speaking about Google, I’ll reference
an old case, Microsoft,37 just 20 years ago: the D.C. Circuit, what they found
was what Microsoft was doing to the browser was trying to preserve its
monopoly power in the operating system because of the indirect network effects
of applications providers.38 And the browser, for the first time, was going to
disintermediate the application programmers from the operating system. So, you
can now write to the browser and read it on any device, and that was a big threat
to Microsoft. The documents showed their intent was to really crush that
because it was going to hurt them. And so, I think, if we found a similar
situation, that would be a problem.
PROF. GENE KIMMELMAN: If I could say, I think the Assistant Attorney
General has it absolutely right. I think Microsoft would be the model, but I also
want to say this is one of the hardest areas for enforcers to predict what is about
to happen next in a market. Because, Judge, as you mentioned, sometimes it’s
not a direct competitor; it can be a complement; it can be someone vertical in
the market. And what we know about digital markets is that apps can take off.
They can get a lot of popularity. They become like platforms, and they could
compete with the underlying dominant player.
And that’s certainly something we would want to see happen in a vibrant,
innovative, competitive market. So, the prediction part is extremely hard. The

36. THE IRISHMAN (Netflix 2019).
37. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 81 (2001) (“A court’s evaluation of an
attempted monopolization claim must include a definition of the relevant market.”).
38. Id. at 49–50.
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documents maybe would show something. And, in antitrust, we also have a
theory that if there’s a series of events that all show indications of this type of
intent to take out players who could compete, that that could be actionable as
well. But they’re very hard. So I’ll then say the most controversial thing that
nobody else will agree with, which is that again I believe in other sectors we’ve
had, Congress has granted authority to agencies to also review transactions,
again, often with much too vague a standard, sometimes not exactly at all an
antitrust focus.
HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: —Are you saying the public interest test is too
vague?
PROF. GENE KIMMELMAN: I do believe it’s too vague for what we’re
talking about here. I think if you’re looking at the digital sector, there ought to
be some kind of a pro-competition test as to whether companies—even the
largest dominant players, not anybody, but the dominant players, can purchase
even small players and put the burdens on the merging parties to actually show
it is beneficial to the market. It yields more competition and does not have the
burden on the government. I think that’s a narrow set of situations. Because
I’m not sure that antitrust can get at those. Certainly not the smallest transactions
that are below reporting requirements without having to go back in later—
consummated mergers. I think these are just really hard. But this is—again, it’s
a policy decision for Congress. Is it important enough to try to crank these
markets open to those who are seeking to compete or potential competitors? I
think it’s worthy of a public debate.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Why don’t we see if we’ve got a question
over here?
QUESTIONER 1: Is there any role for antitrust law to play in preserving free
speech on big-tech platforms online, such as Twitter?
HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: Well, it’s certainly a nuanced answer, but, if
you have competitors, and a consumer would prefer to get a different kind of a
speech, you would allow for that. If there’s one company that controls it, then
they call all the shots of the certain type of viewpoint. I could see that being an
antitrust, not so much a violation based on the ideology proposed, but the fact
that it’s a qualitative element for us to consider is an important element.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Anyone else? Free speech. No. We’ve got
one over here.
JOHN SHU: Thank you, Judge. And thanks to all the panelists. I’m John Shu
from Orange County. Maureen, if you could, what would you like to see the
Ninth Circuit do in the Qualcomm case,39 and do you think it’ll actually happen?

39. FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 935 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. filed Aug. 23, 2019).
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HON. MAUREEN OHLHAUSEN: Well, I don’t want to say too much about
it other than to say what I said in my dissent40 when the FTC brought the action.
I didn’t think that there was a strong theory there. I’m concerned about the
impact on property rights and respect for property rights, and particularly
internationally, and how that will be interpreted. I was not displeased to see the
panel, who granted the stay, site my dissenting opinion, and I look forward to
seeing what the Ninth Circuit decides.
JOHN SHU: Thank you.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Over here.
QUESTIONER 3: Yeah. So, in the last couple of years, I think the Antitrust
Division has had some interest in clarifying some of the contours of the state
action immunity doctrine and submitted some statements of interest in cases in
various courts. I was just wondering if any of you would be willing to speak to
the status of those efforts.
HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: Well, we’ve had, as you may know or might
be referencing, we initiated a new amicus program to file in the various courts’
private cases partly because the interpretation and development of the antitrust
laws will affect our enforcement ability, and we would like to express our
viewpoints without taking sides between the private parties. One of the areas
we’ve looked has been when parties assert overly broad interpretation of various
immunities, including the state action immunity.
And we have filed a number of amicus briefs and statements of interest in
lower courts on those issues, including a no-poach agreement most recently
between Duke and North Carolina,41 where the two parties had agreed not to hire
each other’s radiologists. We filed an amicus brief42 in that case, not only
arguing for a certain standard but arguing against some assertions of state action
immunity. And, of course, the FTC has actually challenged a number of cases,
especially during Maureen’s tenure there: North Carolina Dental43 and few
other matters. We’ve recently filed in other cases.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Great. I think this gentleman was next.
KYLE: Hi. I’m Kyle. I’m a law student from up north. And I have a general
question for whoever would like to answer. At a general level, how do
increasingly large multi-nationals and increasingly different antitrust regimes—
we’ve heard some examples today—what problems or tensions do they
principally cause, and are there any solutions that are on the horizon?

40. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen
In the Matter of Qualcomm, Inc. (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_statements/1055143/170117qualcomm_mko_dissenting_statement.pdf.
41. Seaman v. Duke Univ., No. 1:15-CV-462, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31337 (M.D.N.C. Feb.
12, 2016).
42. Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 1, Seaman v. Duke Univ., No.
1:15-CV-462, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31337 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 12, 2016).
43. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494 (2015).
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HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: I’ll let Rainer explain the effort that we jointly
did with the European Commission, and Canada, and a number of others, but,
for the first time in history, I’m proud to say that we actually have a multilateral
agreement on some aspects of antitrust. And this was on due process. It was an
initiative about a year and a half ago. We worked closely with our friends in
European Commission, Canada, Australia, Japan, multiple different types of
legal systems to, at a minimum, have a lot of—in the process of enforcement to
have the same, I think, recognized due process principles, like attorney-client
privilege, like the right to counsel and a number of others, about 12, I think,
principles in those agreement, which now have 72 agencies signed on to that.
Now, I think the discussions continue. We all come from different regimes and
different goals for some of the competition, but I think more and more we’re
converging a lot more on the substantive principles but procedurally as well.
KYLE: Thank you.
DR. RAINER WESSELY: Just to add, perhaps, the initiative was indeed very
welcomed. We had to fine tune the framework, so we inserted it in the
international competition network. I think, in the end, to the satisfaction of
everybody, we were proud that we signed it as one of the first.
HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: Thank you.
DR. RAINER WESSELY: And perhaps, to add, I think taking it from antitrust
debate to merger enforcement, we already have a very good track record in
cooperating extremely closely with the DOJ, with the FTC, not only on process
and procedure, aligning our merger reviews, but in particular, also, when it
comes to substance. We had really important decisions. Let’s take BayerMonsanto,44 for example, where we followed along and were able to obtain very
good remedies, which worked on both sides of the Atlantic, so I think there is a
lot more and fruitful common basis than sometimes perceived outside.
HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: But it takes a lot of work, and it doesn’t mean
our work is done. We have to be diligent. We have 140 antitrust agencies. I
joke sometimes: that’s one of our greatest exports out of the United States. Any
one agency can weaponize by misapplying the antitrust rules for whatever, and
there’s no international regime to retaliate against that. So, it requires a lot of
discussion, a lot of engagement, and a lot of understanding with well-meaning
people, which we have, and I think that’s really important.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: I think over here.
MAX FILLION: Hi. I’m Max Fillion with MLex. There’s been some
discussion about forced data access as a remedy for certain types of conduct, and
Mr. Delrahim, I was wondering if this is something that the DOJ is considering
and what types of conduct might spur a remedy like that?
HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: Well, we’ll have to see what types of conduct
could do that. I think, as a general matter, when companies are gathering that
type of information, the data, and have invested in it, we certainly don’t want to
44. Case M.8084—Bayer/Monsanto, Comm’n Decision, 2018 O.J. (C 459).
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have forced sharing. I think the Supreme Court has warned against those
conditions under which you can do that, and it’s the outlier within Section II, but
it doesn’t mean that it’s not an appropriate remedy to use, certainly, in a merger
context, where you have market power and review data as an asset and an input.
If there are companies that have a certain kind of data, we would ask for
structural relief and a divestiture of certain collection of data.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Anyone else? No.
PROF. GENE KIMMELMAN: I like that.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: How about over here?
DEENA CALIUM: Thanks very much. I’m Deena Calium. I’m asking for
myself, and I’m not a member of the press. Earlier this summer, we heard that
the division announced a change to how it’s going to consider compliance
programs. Since we’re talking about the future of antitrust and convergence, I’d
be happy to hear from any panelists who care to comment on this topic, whether
you think indeed the future of antitrust should be placing more emphasis in
considering compliance programs and, perhaps, whether this is an area where
we can see international convergence.
HON. MAKAN DELRAHIM: I think you mentioned the DOJ did that July
11th. We’re very proud of that policy change. I think it’s for the better. I don’t
know—Rainer—I don’t know which other regimes factor that in. So not every
140 agency has a criminal element to their enforcement regime, and so it might
be limited to who does that. But it is an important part to try to motivate as many
companies to not only ensure that they’re complying with the laws but put the
appropriate mechanisms in to trigger when somebody may transgress.
DR. RAINER WESSELY: Well, I think it will not surprise you that
Commissioner Vestager keeps repeating that she welcomes any effort by
companies to be compliant.45 But I think the line that we had in the past that we
do not want to give benefit to compliance programs, if they are not working, is
still the same. So, if we see that there has been an antitrust violation, or cartel,
then we still think that there are good reasons not—let’s say, for example—to
give a fines reduction because there was a compliance program in place, which
in the end has turned out not to work, so that is still our line.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Over here.
CRAIG RICHARDSON: Yeah. My name is Craig Richardson, and, General,
I had the great honor of studying under one of your predecessors, antitrust Bill
Baxter, who I think is part of the Baxter revolution, championed the concept that
well understood microeconomic principles to guide—actually, more to the point:
restrain—antitrust enforcement. It reflected a view that markets, free people in
free markets, do a better job of allocating resources and promoting consumer
welfare than central planners.

45. European Commission Press Release IP/19/1828, Antitrust: Commission Fines Nike
€12.5 Million for Restricting Cross-Border Sales of Merchandising Products (March 25, 2019).
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The Wall Street Journal, recently, in the last six months had a very long article
about the breakdown of the bipartisan consensus that emerged from Bill Baxter
about those well understood microeconomic principles and suggested there’s a
shift to political objection to bigness, really part of perhaps a broader critique
that’s going on right now about capitalism.46 Really, this is a question for all the
panelists, to what extent do you agree that shift is taking place before our eyes,
and to what extent does that shift affect the discussion about data and high tech
that you’ve just engaged in?
PROF. GENE KIMMELMAN: Well, I think that it is definitely a factor in the
political environment and the policy environment around antitrust. I don’t see
any sign that antitrust enforcers are deviating from the general approach to the
principles of the standards. But I think those issues of bigness are really
oversimplified descriptions of experiences people are feeling in the digital
marketplace, with a few companies tending to dominate. And we need to take
legitimate concerns there and put them into the right policy discussion, I don’t
think it leads to any one necessary solution, but I don’t believe it is in antitrust.
Antitrust should be sensitive to that to the extent it’s about market power and
dominance, but it doesn’t mean that the public sector shouldn’t be worried about
whether a few companies are dominating across societies. So, I think our
problem here is that too much emphasis is being put on antitrust, the moment
someone says companies are big, rather than thinking about where in
government do we discuss these issues where we have appropriate solutions.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Do you think that that—we’re seeing a lot
of people complaining about bigness, and is that why they’re straight to antitrust
as opposed to thinking about other solutions or regulatory formulations that it
just seems like antitrust should be the solution because of the old trust busting,
whatever it would be—the Sherman Act47 understanding?
PROF. GENE KIMMELMAN: I certainly think that’s part of it, but let me
bring in one other element too, and that is that Congress today is not the most
functional it’s ever been in dealing with public policy discussions—and certainly
in my experience of more than 35 years watching Congress. And, in the past,
one would have seen committees that have jurisdiction over large companies
have a lot more hearings to discuss “Is there something wrong in the
marketplace? Has something gone awry? Do we need to worry about this?”
And you would have a lot more discussion about a broad set of policy tools. I
think with a vacuum there of less of that kind of conversation in Congress,
people assume that because it’s about size, it must be antitrust, and I think that’s
really misplaced.

46. John Bateman, The Antitrust Threat to National Security, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Oct. 23, 2019.
47. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38 (1890).
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HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Do you think that the Sherman Act48 and
the Clayton Act49 are not what we would think of as modern legislation in the
sense of being very hyper-technical detailed whatnot? Do we risk something if
we go back and we ask Congress to get into the minutiae of this, and we go to
the other end, or are we better off with the flexible, more open-ended statute?
PROF. GENE KIMMELMAN: Old isn’t necessarily bad.
[Laughter.]
And, I think the flexibility has served us well. I think actually that the more
important point related to that is: is the current jurisprudence interpreting those
statutes in sync with how markets are actually functioning?
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Blame the judges.
PROF. GENE KIMMELMAN: I didn’t say that.
[Laughter.]
You could interpret it that way. Let’s just say, I think, it would be appropriate
for Congress to look back and see whether the laws have been applied effectively
to get the biggest bang for your buck within the antitrust framework, not going
outside of it. I think the issues outside of it ought to be dealt with, along with
other policy tools.
HON. MAUREEN OHLHAUSEN: I was just going to mention also that I
think—to Gene’s point, as well—if there are competitive issues occurring, real
competitive problems, that antitrust is supposed to address what the agencies
haven’t been able to address, because their tools haven’t been finely tuned
enough, I think that’s an important area on which to focus. For example, going
back a few years, the FTC and DOJ lost eight hospital merger challenges in a
row, could not get a court to believe that the merger of these hospital systems
was going to cause a competitive issue. There was good empirical work done
that looked at a consummated merger, and said “Yes, these anticompetitive
outcomes did occur.”
And then the record, since then, has been much, much more success in
challenging hospital mergers. I think that’s an area where you can say, “Look,
if there is something that we’re missing,” if we can go far enough back in
acquiring nascent competitors to know back then that that [sic] was going to be
the one that was going to upend the market dominant player who was purchasing
them, if our tools can get to that point, then that would, I think, be an appropriate
thing for antitrust to focus on because that’s what antitrust is supposed to be
doing. Its tools can improve over time and should improve.
HON. JOHN B. NALBANDIAN: Great. Any other comments? No. I don’t
think we have any other questions, so join me in thanking our panel.

48. Id.
49. The Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (1914).
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